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Abstract   
When Argentine sovereign default in December 2001 led to a collapse of the peso, the 
burden of dollar debt became demonstrably unsustainable. But it was not clear what 
restructuring was feasible, nor when. Eventually, in 2005 after a delay of more than three 
years, a supermajority of creditors accepted a swap implying a recovery rate of around 37 
cents in the dollar. In this paper a bargaining approach is used to explain both the 
settlement and the delay.  We conclude that the agreed swap broadly corresponds to a 
bargaining outcome where the Argentine government had “first mover” advantage: and that 
substantial delay occurred as negotiators seeking a sustainable settlement waited for 
economic recovery. Factors not explicit in the formal framework are also considered -- 
heterogeneity of creditors, for example, and the role of third parties in promoting “good 
faith” bargaining. 
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Non technical summary 
 
After a delay of more than three years, most of the Argentine sovereign debt in default was 
successfully restructured by mid-2005. This episode is important both for those directly 
involved and also as a marker for the resolution of insolvency crises to come. It is clear, for 
example, that lenders to emerging markets are exposed to substantial losses -- and to 
prolonged delay in restructuring. But the proceedings have challenged the idea that the IMF 
must play a central role in arranging sovereign debt swaps: “Argentina has also become a 
test case for a vastly reduced role for the IMF and the official sector more broadly in the 
sovereign debt restructuring process”, Roubini and Setser (2004a). The IMF proposal for a 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism – first advanced when Argentina was sliding 
towards default – was blocked by a broad coalition of borrowers, private lenders and 
sovereign states including the US; and the Fund itself, stymied by conflict of interest and 
criticised by both debtor and creditors for its earlier handling of Argentine case, had to 
withdraw to the sidelines and let creditors and debtor sort things out themselves. What are 
the new rules of the game? 
 
Some look for a return of the IMF to handling crisis resolution. For Jérome Sgard, the key 
role it played in the 1980s during the Latin American debt crisis provides the benchmark 
for its future role in the restructuring of sovereign bonds. “Since at least the 1920’s and 
especially under the classical regime of the 1980s, renegotiation regimes were established 
under a multilateral umbrella which locked together three key functions: economic 
expertise and information, third-party arbitration and guarantees of execution. This indeed 
allowed [reconciliation of] the efficiency and equity criteria which are preconditions for the 
resolution of any insolvency crisis” Sgard ( 2004, p 29).   In a paper written before the swap 
was arranged, Roubini and Setser (2004a) gave a number of reasons to suggest that the new 
approach to debt restructuring would not work, including the wide gap in expectations 
between creditors looking for 65 cents in the dollar and debtor “restructuring guidelines” 
promising 25 cents (or less, at crisis discount rates). In the ir monograph on Bail- ins and 
Bail-outs,  Roubini and Setser (2004b), they conclude: “It is unrealistic to think that … a 
better process for restructuring sovereign bonds will allow the IMF to disengage from the 
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sovereign debt restructuring process. …We like bond clauses, but they are no substitute for 
an active IMF in the resolution of debt crises.”  
Instead of looking for third party intervention, we examine the Argentine debt swap to see 
whether a bargaining approach can help to explain both the final settlement and the delay in 
achieving it.  Absent institutional reform, this may reveal the shape of things to come. 
A bargaining approach 
 
After a brief account of the Argentine convertibility plan of the 1990s and its collapse in 
2002, we describe the initiative taken by the Argentine government at Dubai in 2003 
(which we interpret as expressing the constraints imposed by debt sustainability), and the 
formal offer of early 2005, which has been accepted by 76% of the creditors. A bargaining 
approach is then applied to help explain both the settlement itself and the protracted delay 
in achieving it. Bulow and Rogoff (1989) outlined a framework where creditor and debtor 
bargain over a determinate “pie” representing the gains from trade to the debtor. Here, 
however, we adopt the approach of Merlo and Wilson (1998) where the size of the pie is 
uncertain and  ‘efficient delay’ can occur as both parties wait for economic recovery 
(fearing that early agreement will lock in the recession) 2.  
 
To define the pie to be divided between debtor and creditors, we note that, when confronted 
with the limited residual3 indicated by the debtor’s restructuring guidelines at Dubai, the 
creditor response was to more than double what the Argentine government estimated was 
sustainable at that time. Specifically, the Argentine Bondholders’ Committee (ABC) called 
for a recovery rate of 65cents in the dollar on defaulted debt, rather than the 25 cent 
recovery rate implied by the debtor’s guidelines. Scaling up the ‘Dubai residual’ in line 
with this demand implies a pie worth almost 3% of GDP.  
 
The Merlo-Wilson model is calibrated on the assumption that each party has equal-
probability of being proposer (as to restructuring), and, without knowing who will act, the 
expected split would be 50:50. There is, however, “first mover” advantage for whoever 
                                                 
2 We are grateful to Stephen Morris for first suggesting this approach to us. 
3I.e. t he residual remaining for holders of defaulted debt after paying IFIs and other senior creditors in full. 
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actually proposes. When the debtor has the “first mover” advantage, creditors get only 46% 
of the pie, receiving a flow transfer of about $1.85bn dollars at 2004 prices. The predicted 
recovery rate on debt without interest is 41 cents in this bargaining equilibrium, a little 
better than the actual Buenos Aires offer (estimated to be worth about 37cents). In other 
words, the model we use predicts a somewhat more generous outcome for the creditors than 
the actual Argentine offer of early 2005. 
 
Delay 
 
Was the delay in settlement due to political or economic factors? The fact that President 
Duhalde was only chosen by the congress as interim office-holder until full elections could 
be held in 2003 may suggest the former were decisive. But the Merlo-Wilson framework 
shows how economic incentives can cause delay. Broadly speaking, delay is efficient when 
the expected annual rate of economic recovery exceeds and the time rate of discount. The 
logic for this is that any settlement “locks in” the recession: when the condition is satisfied 
it pays to wait.  
 
We find that during Duhalde’s administration the “expected” growth rate greatly exceeded 
the discount rate: this suggests that debt restructuring would have been postponed even if 
there had been no problem of legitimacy. That political legitimacy itself was not the critical 
factor is supported by the fact that delay continued  even when President Kirchner was 
legitimately elected in 2003. (That the expected growth rate still exceeded the discount rate 
is consistent with continued delay for economic reasons.)  
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Challenges to the bargaining framework 
 
Economic incentives for delay may be captured in broad terms by the bargaining 
framework: but what of the specific commitments made at Dubai? Were these sustainability 
conditions the decisive factor?  
Comparing bargaining outcome with the sustainability constraint, suggests that debt-
restructuring in 2003 with the economy in depression would have violated the sustainability 
condition. But as the economy recovered the sustainability condition increased, so that by 
2004 it roughly matches the bargaining equilibrium we have calculated. Ipso facto, the 
actual offer made by Argentine government in 2005 (assuming the recovery rate on offer is 
extended to those outside the swap) also satisfies sustainability.  Thus, though no formal 
account is taken of the 3% sustainability condition in the model we use, it appears that the 
logic of the bargaining approach is consistent with the need for a durable settlement: 
creditors who were willing to wait until the debtor could pay more effectively allowed 
Argentina to propose a sustainable settlement.  
 
Other factors not explicit in the formal framework are also considered - creditor 
heterogeneity, for example, and institutional features that may have helped enforce ‘good 
faith’ bargaining -- political and economic pressure by G7 creditor countries, or by the IMF 
acting as their agent, for example, and the legal decisions made by Judge Griesa in New 
York, the official responsible for adjudicating creditors’ claims under US law.  
 
Conclusion   
 
In a positive analysis, a bargaining approach is used to explain the recovery rates in the 
Argentine sovereign debt swap of 2005 and to account for the considerable lapse of time it 
took to arrange -  over three years from default to majority acceptance of the swap. With 
state-contingent contracts ruled out by political factors, expectations of economic recovery 
could account for delay by negotiators seeking a sustainable settlement.  
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Debt restructuring is not yet complete, as only 76% of the old bonds have been swapped. 
(The fall in the price of defaulted bonds after the swap --from around 40 cents to 32 cents 
for 2008 bonds, for example -- suggests that holdouts may, on this occasion, suffer a bigger 
haircut than those who settled – perhaps receiving the new performing bonds as in the 2005 
offer less the coupons paid pending the final resolution.) So there are clearly issues of 
creditor heterogeneity that need further investigation. 
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Bargaining and sustainability:  the Argentine debt swap of 2005 
 
 
After a delay of more than three years, most of $100bn of Argentine sovereign debt in 
default was successfully restructured by mid-2005. This episode is important both for those 
directly involved and also as a marker for the resolution of insolvency crises to come. It is 
clear for example, that lenders to emerging markets are exposed to substantial losses - and 
to prolonged delay in restructuring. But the proceedings have challenged the idea that the 
IMF must play a central role in arranging sovereign debt swaps, Roubini and Setser 
(2004a). Its proposed Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism – first advanced when 
Argentina was sliding towards default – was blocked by a broad coalition of borrowers, 
private lenders and sovereign states including the US; and the Fund itself, stymied by 
conflict of interest and criticised by both debtor and creditors for its earlier handling of 
Argentine case, had to withdraw to the sidelines and let creditors and debtor sort things out 
themselves. What are the new rules of the game? 
 
Some look for a return of the IMF to handling crisis resolution. For Jérome Sgard, the key 
role it played in the 1980s during the Latin American debt crisis provides the benchmark 
for its future role in the restructuring of sovereign bonds. “Since at least the 1920’s and 
especially under the classical regime of the 1980s, renegotiation regimes were established 
under a multilateral umbrella which locked together three key functions: economic 
expertise and information, third-party arbitration and guarantees of execution. This indeed 
allowed [reconciliation of] the efficiency and equity criteria which are preconditions for the 
resolution of any insolvency crisis” (Sgard, 2004, p 29). Likewise, Roubini and Setser 
(2004b) assert: “It is unrealistic to think that … a better process for restructuring sovereign 
bonds will allow the IMF to disengage from the sovereign debt restructuring process. …We 
like bond clauses, but they are no substitute for an active IMF in the resolution of debt 
crises.”  
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Given the status quo, however, we examine the current Argentine debt swap to see whether 
bargaining theory can help to explain both the final settlement and the delay in achieving it.  
Absent institutional reform, this may reveal the shape of things to come. 
 
After a brief account of the Argentine convertibility plan of the 1990s and its collapse in 
2002, we describe the initiative taken by the Argentine government at Dubai in 2003 
(which we interpret as expressing the constraints of sustainability), and the formal offer of 
early 2005, which has been accepted by 76% of the creditors. A bargaining approach is 
then applied to help explain both the settlement itself and the protracted delay in achieving 
it4. Bulow and Rogoff (1989) outlined a framework where creditor and debtor bargain over 
a determinate “pie” representing the gains from trade to the debtor. Here, however, we 
adopt the approach of Merlo and Wilson (1998) where the size of the pie is uncertain and  
‘efficient delay’ can occur as both parties wait for economic recovery (fearing that early 
agreement will lock in the recession)  5. We also discuss how the bargaining equilibria relate 
to the sustainability criteria adopted at Dubai.  
 
Factors not explicit in the formal framework are also considered - creditor heterogeneity, 
for example, and various institutional features that may have helped enforce ‘good faith’ 
bargaining -- political and economic pressure by G7 creditor countries, or by the IMF 
acting as their agent6, for example, and the legal decisions made by Judge Griesa in New 
York, the judge responsible for adjudicating creditors’ claims under US law. We conclude 
that while the model of bilateral bargaining provides a useful framework for explaining 
outcome of the current debt swap and the delay in achieving it there are open questions of 
heterogeneous beliefs and inter-creditor conflict needing further investigation.  
                                                 
4 “In Pakistan, Ukraine, Ecuador, Russia and Uruguay over 90% of the creditors accept[ed] the debtor’s initial offer… Only Russia’s 
restructuring took more than one year, and no restructuring took more than two years.” Roubini and Sester (2004) 
5 We are grateful to Stephen Morris for first suggesting this approach .. 
6 G7 countries have 45.3 % of votes in IMF, which implies that G7 wishes are not strictly coalition proof. But the power indices 
discussed  in  Leech (2002) imply that, if  G7  acts as a cohesive group, it has almost complete dominance over the decisions made by the 
organisatio n   
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1. The Argentine debt swap: a Bargaining approach  
 
1 ( a) Background  
 
The Convertibility Plan and its collapse   
  
Following a bout of hyperinflation in 1989-90, Argentina adopted a Convertibility Plan 
“which stipulated a one-for-one parity between the Argentine peso and the US dollar and  
guaranteed the right to convert pesos at that rate, meaning that devaluation would require a 
new act to be passed by Congress” (Williamson, 1995). For the following decade Argentine 
was the largest country in the world employing a currency board system, a monetary 
arrangement in which the country abandons its monetary sovereignty in favour of a rule 
which links its monetary base to the inflow and outflow of dollars on its overall balance of 
payments. 
 
Inflation ended promptly; and the economy grew rapidly in the early 1990s. But the 
strength of the dollar against the euro and devaluations by trading partners such as Mexico 
and Brazil made it increasingly difficult to maintain the convertibility regime. Finally, with 
capital outflows leading to repeated bank runs, the peg proved unsustainable, and the end of 
the currency board was likened to a ‘slow-motion train crash’ both because it was widely 
foreseen and because its effects were so catastrophic. Izquierdo (2004) explains why  a 
highly indebted, dollarized and relatively closed economy like Argentina was particularly 
vulnerable to sudden stops; and  Bleaney (2004) discusses the relative contributions of 
weak policy and bad luck. Debt default was declared in December 2001, and the currency 
soon fell by more than two thirds of its value against the dollar. The country was thrown 
into constitutional chaos and economic despair, with unemployment rising to 20% and half 
the population falling below the poverty line. Negotiations over debt restructuring were 
postponed until a new President was elected and economic recovery got under way.  
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When the currency board looked increasingly unviable in 2001, the IMF had proposed a 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism modelled on Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy 
Code (which allows the debtor to manage the restructuring of creditor claims under court 
supervision), Krueger (2002). This effort to formalise the process - and to put the IMF at 
the centre of the stage - was dropped in the face of objections from creditor representatives, 
large debtors and the US Treasury. Consequently the process of restructuring was left to a 
large extent for negotiation between the sovereign government and the bondholders, using 
the procedures of the courts under whose laws the debt was issued. The US court in New 
York in particular has played a key role, the judge there having to decide whether or not the 
debtor is negotiating ‘in good faith’: and, if not, what sanctions may be applicable. Before 
sketching a framework for analysing good faith bargaining, however, we first outline the 
size of the problem to be resolved, the sustainability constraints outlined by the debtor and 
the formal offer made in 2005. 
 
Drowning in debt 
 
After the peso collapsed from its peg of one-to-one with the dollar, the ratio of Argentina’s 
dollar-denominated sovereign debt to its national income rose to alarming levels. By 2003, 
the amount of dollar debt outstanding came to about $182 billion, of which $81 billion was 
owed to Preferred debtors7 with the remainder owed to private creditors, about $101billion 
including unpaid interest, see Table 1. At an exchange rate of three pesos to the dollar, 
sovereign indebtedness amounted to about 140% of 2003 GDP, a ratio more than double 
Maastricht target of 60%, and almost five times the analogous figure of 30% suggested for 
emerging markets. At a real interest rate of ten and a half per cent 8, the cost of servicing the 
debt to private creditors (including interest due) would have been over ten billion dollars. 
Adding this sum (which, after default, was not being paid) to the flow for preferred debt 
that was being serviced ($2.8 bn), gives a total cost of over thirteen billion dollars: so fully 
servicing government debt from a GPD of $130 billion without further borrowing would 
                                                 
7 International Financial Institutions and ‘new issue’ bonds (those issued during the crisis to domestic depositors and to recapitalise the 
banks). 
8 Damill et al (2005) report a discount rate for emerging market of 12-14% at that time. An inflation correction can be obtained  by 
subtracting the yield on medium-term indexed securities (TIPs)  from US benchmark government bonds, giving a figure of about 2.75%.  
We round this to 2.5% and subtract it from the lower end of Damill’s range to give a real rate of 10.5% used in the table. 
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have required a primary surplus of over ten percent of national income.  This was clearly 
infeasible, so a write-down was necessary - as acknowledged by the Argentine Government 
at the IMF/World Bank meetings in Dubai in September 2003.  
 
The Dubai initiative – guidelines for sustainability  
 
The first key element of the Argentine initiative was the decision to allocate at most three 
percent of GDP for servicing sovereign debt; the second was to finance its service by a 
(primary) fiscal surplus and not by further borrowing; and the final element was to privilege 
preferred creditors with full compensation despite the threefold increase in the peso price 
of the dollar. Given the cost of servicing these preferred creditors (estimated at almost $3bn 
dollars) and the depressed level of GDP with Argentina in recession, these sustainability 
constraints left a sum of only about a billion dollars - a ‘Dubai residual’ of less than one 
percent of GDP - for servicing private debt holders after the swap (Table 1, column 3).  
 
Table 1: Dubai initiative: Debt outstanding and sustainable debt service.  
 Gov’t 
Dollar debt 
Service 
cost(2)@ 
10.5% 
Debt service  
proposed at 
Dubai 
Recovery 
Rate(3) 
Total debt $182   
(140% of GDP ) 
 $3.9  
(3.0 % of 
GDP)  
 
 Preferred 
Creditors 
$81  $ 2.8 
 
 
Others 
including past-
due interest 
$101   $10.6  
 
$1.1  
(0.8 % of 
GDP) 
10c 
Others 
excluding PDI 
$81  
 
$8.5 
 
$1.1  13c (4) 
Notes (1):  2003 GDP approx $130bn (GDP at current market prices of 376bn pesos9 converted at 2.90)         
        (2):  For source of real rate of 10.5% see footnote. 
       (3):  Recovery rate = debt service / service cost    
    (4):  Market value of $1.1bn capitalised at 10.5% = $10.5bn which is 13% of $81bn 
 
At a post-crisis real interest rate of about five percent, a settlement on those terms in 2003 
would have represented a recovery rate of only 27% on debt without PDI of $81 billion; 
                                                 
9 Ministerio de Economía y Producción (2005, Informe 51) 
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and this was how it was described by the Argentine government10.  But at the real interest 
rates prevailing at the time, the recovery rate was only about half that: and this was how it 
was treated in the press, e.g. “… Argentina’s offer is worth less than 10 cents on the 
dollar.” Financial Times Intelligence unit, 8 March 2004.The figures in the last column, 
using  the rate of 10.5%, imply a recovery rate for creditors of only 13c  on debt without 
PDI; and ten cents  on debt with past due  interest. 
 
Why should the Argentine government have chosen to impose such a tight constraint on the 
resources available to private creditors? The answer, we believe, is its determination to 
achieve a sustainable settlement, and so to avoid a repeat of the default which had led to 
historically unprecedented social and economic disruption. (How the sustainability 
constraints relate to the bargaining equilibria of this paper is discussed further below.) 
 
The Buenos Aires offer 
 
When a formal offer of a swap was finally made in early 2005,  it was worth about 37 cents 
in the dollar11. The strong recovery of the economy had - given the fixed dollar cost of 
servicing preferred creditors - generated a substantial increase in the resources available to 
pay private creditors, Damill et al. (2005); and the decline in real interest rates had 
increased the market’s valuation of service flows on offer. As a crude estimate of the 
“permanent” flow of real resources implicit in the swap we take 37% of the full cost of 
servicing dollar debt at a post crisis real interest rate of 5.5%12: this gives the figure of 
$1.65bn for private creditors13 shown in table 2, a real flow of approximately 1.1% of 2004 
GDP.  
 
A recovery rate of 37 cents in the dollar on outstanding may sound like a generous 
settlement - but this is without taking into account past due interest. The value of the new 
                                                 
10 The Argentine Bondholders Committee promptly responded by calling for a recovery rate of 60%, i.e. about two and a half times the 
25% figure proposed by the government.  We use the ratio 60/25 = 2.4 to estimate the size of the pie being bargained over. 
11 This was the cum-dividend offer made to holders of dollar par bonds (see Sabina Amboage, Clarin , 5 June 2005). This is broadly 
consistent with estimates of 30-34 cents (Damill et al, 2005) and 30-35 cents (Financial Times Intelligence 7 March 2005) made at the 
time of the offer when interest rates were higher.  
12 Obtained by subtracting 2.5% for US inflation from the figure of 8% given for the EMBI without Argentina, Calvo, 2005. 
13 Together with $2.8 billion needed for preferred creditors, the primary surplus needed for debt service is 2.9% of 2004 GDP. 
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debt is approximately $30 billion at post-crisis real rates, which represents a recovery rate 
of only 30c in the dollar on debt including past due interest (which had grown to about 
$100bn, see  row 1 of Table 2).  
 
Table 2: Buenos Aires offer: the flow available for servicing non-performing debt  
 
 Gov’t 
Dollar debt 
Service cost 
@  5.5%(2) 
Debt service 
estimated from 
market prices 
Recovery 
Rate(3) 
Debt to be 
restructured 
(including past-
due interest) 
$101   
(66% of 2004 
GDP) 
$5.56 $1.65 
(1.1% GDP) 
30c 
Debt to be 
restructured 
(excluding past-
due interest) 
$81  
(53%) 
$4.46 
 
$1.65 
(1.1% GDP) 
37c 
 
Notes (1):  2004 GDP approx $153bn (GDP at current market prices of 447bn14 pesos converted at 2.92)         
        (2): Obtained by subtracting 2.5% for US inflation from the figure of 8% given for the EMBI without Argentina, 
Calvo, 2005. 
       (3):  Recovery rate = debt service / service cost    
 
 
1(b) A bargaining framework 
 
Can bargaining theory help explain such an outcome? Bulow and Rogoff (1989) showed 
how Rubinstein’s (1982) canonical formulation of non-cooperative bargaining with 
alternating offers could be applied to debt negotiations. Creditor and debtor bargain over 
the fraction of GDP representing the value of the gains from trade to the debtor15; and a 
settlement is when both agree on the share to be allocated to the creditors. Where all the 
parameters are common knowledge and both agents are rational, a Pareto-efficient 
settlement is reached without delay. In a paper written soon after the Dubai initiative, this 
approach was used to anticipate what might emerge from the debt negotiations, providing a 
forecast settlement of between 31 and 40 cents in the dollar depending on the relative rates 
of discount of the parties concerned, Miller and Fronti, 2003.16 
                                                 
14 Ministerio de Economía y Producción (2005, Informe 51) 
15 Trade being the hostage to the debt negotiations, the gains from trade will be lost if they fail.  
16 In the paper cited, the estimates ranged from 31 to 35 cents; press reports, Clarin 18 Dec 2003, referred to an earlier estimate of 40 
cents based on different assumptions as to relative interest rates. 
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While it may have produced a reasonable forecast of the final outcome, this approach failed 
to explain the delay. Absent contingent contracts, Merlo and Wilson (1998) have shown 
that both parties might accept delay if the pie is expected to increase with economic 
recovery. 17 Their analysis also captures the important idea that an early agreement might 
postpone recovery. 18 Because it explains delay and crudely captures the idea that growth is 
endogenous, this alternative bargaining framework is adopted in this paper. Technical 
details of the analysis are available in Miller and García-Fronti, 2005. 
 
1 (c) Bargaining in the case of Argentina  
 
Defining the pie 
 
How to define the pie to be divided between debtor and creditors? The estimate we use is 
not based on explicit calculations of gains from trade as in Bulow and Rogoff, but on 
“looking at the cards” of the creditors to see what they revealed of the gains they hoped to 
extract19. Note that, when confronted with the limited resources indicated by the debtor in 
the Dubai initiative, the creditor response was to more than double what the Argentine 
government estimated was sustainable at that time: specifically, the Argentine 
Bondholders’ Committee (ABC) called for a recovery rate in the region of two thirds of the 
debt outstanding. Scaling up the ‘Dubai residual’ in line with this demand implied a pie 
worth about 2.64% GDP 20.  
 
What this implies for the situation in 2004 is shown in the first row of Table 3: applying the 
same percentage to the higher level of GDP gives an annual flow of about $ 4 billion at 
constant 2004 prices as an estimate of the pie to be divided. Clearly allocating everything to 
                                                 
17 As an illust ration of their approach, they suggest that restructuring Latin America debt in the 1980s was postponed to allow US banks 
to provision for the losses involved in writing down emerging market debt: without delay the banks would have been in serious trouble. 
18 This idea, emphasized by Daniel Heymann and others, was explored in Miller and García-Fronti (2004) using an explicit endogenous 
grow model. 
19 The procedure used here is as described in Miller and Garcia-Fronti (2003): in conversation, Rogoff considered it a neat alternative to 
estimating the gains from trade.  
20 2.64% = 60/25 * 1.1% where 60% is the ABC response, 25% is Dubai proposal and 1.1% is the Dubai residual, cf. Miller and Fronti 
(2003). 
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the creditors would have violated the Dubai sustainability constraint21. So how was it to be 
divided? 
 
Table 3: Dividing the Pie: Creditor’s payoffs on restructured debt  
 
 Fraction 
of pie for 
the 
creditors 
Percent 
of GDP 
in 2004 
2004 
Dollars 
Billion 
Recovery Rate(1)  
(on debt w/o 
interest ) 
Required 
primary 
surplus (2) 
Size of pie   (3)  100% 2.6 % $4 90 cents 4.4 % 
Unconditional 
Bargaining 
outcome      (4) 
50% 1.3% $2 45 cents 3.1% 
 
Bargaining 
Outcome with 
Argentina as first 
mover  (5) 
46% 1.2% $1.85 41cents 3.0% 
Actual Buenos 
Aires offer   (6) 
47% 1.1% $1.65 37cents 2.9% 
Sustainability (7) 45% 1.2% $1.79 40 cents 3.0% 
 
Notes  (1) Calculated as ratio of post-swap interest flows (column 3) to (notional) pre-swap interest flows of $4.46bn  
on a total debt of $81bn as in Table 1, applying an interest rate of 5.5% (the EMBI rate without Argentina from 
Calvo (2005) less 2.5% for US inflation)  
            (2) The primary surplus (including $2.8bn for senior creditors, see Table 1) needed to stabilize government debt 
in real terms (and not relative to GDP). 
(3) Based on the ABC response in Dubai, updated to 2004 GDP. 
          (4) Source: Table 2. The required primary surplus is calculated as $2.8bn + $2bn = $4.8bn, which is 3.1% of 
GDP of $153bn 
 (5) Conditional on Argentina making the first offer. 
 (6) See table 2, row 2 
 (7) See below 
 
Ex-ante forecast: “Splitting the pie” 
 
To see the predicted settlement of bargaining in good faith and how it compares with the 
offer which has been accepted, we turn to the MW framework, starting with the 
unconditional forecast when the identity of the proposer (who actually makes the offer) is 
not yet determined. Assuming equal probability of being proposer, the forecast is simply to 
“split the pie”: if neither player knows whether it will have “first mover” advantage, each 
                                                 
21 As indicated in the first line of Table 3 it would have implied a recovery rate of 90% (on debt excluding rolled up interest) and a total 
servicing cost of over 4.4% of GDP when account is taken of the cost of senior debt. 
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expects half the pie22. In this bargaining equilibrium, creditors would expect a flow transfer 
of about $2bn dollars at 2004 prices – 1.3% of GDP (see Table 3, second row); this 
represents a recovery rate of 45cents in the dollar on debt without interest.23 
 
The case where Argentina has first mover advantage  
 
If Argentina is the proposer, however, it will gain a tactical advantage, so creditors will get 
less than half the pie. Specifically, when Argentina has “first mover” advantage, creditors 
will get only 46% of the pie 24, receiving a flow transfer of about $1.85bn dollars at 2004 
prices, Table 3 line 3. The implicit recovery rate on debt without interest falls to 41 cents in 
this case; but the creditors would still do better than in the actual Buenos Aires offer (see 
column 4 of table 3): so the model we use with symmetric ex-ante bargaining power 
predicts a somewhat more generous outcome for the creditors25 than the actual Argentine 
offer of early 2005. (It is nevertheless consistent with the sustainability criteria, as we show 
below.) 
 
Assuming a process of bargaining in good faith, Figure 1 indicates schematically how the 
increase in GDP may have affected the size of the settlement. The pie after economic 
recovery is shown as the solid line (estimated at $4bn, being 2.64% of 2004 GDP) and the 
bargaining predictions are shown labelled as points S (Split the pie) and F (where Argentina 
has first mover advantage). The actual Buenos Aires offer, shown at point B, gives 
creditors less than either of the bargaining outcomes – and gives the debtor correspondingly 
more. The improvement for Argentina over splitting the pie is the reduction of 8 cents in 
the recovery rate (table 3 column 4): half of which is accounted for the tactical first mover 
advantage. To account for the rest, one has to increase the strategic power for debtor by 
increasing the ex-ante probability of being proposer (a) above a half.26  
                                                 
22 As Binmore (1992) points out, this prediction corresponds to the outcome of cooperative bargaining where both parties have the same 
bargaining power, Nash (1950) 
23 This represents a recovery rate of 36 % on debt including past due interest (PDI), which has an interesting interpretation: it implies that 
debt including PDI is broadly written down in line with the peso, i.e. dollar debt is ‘pesified’. 
24 This is on the assumption that there is equal ex-ante probability of being proposer, that the annual discount rate is 4%  and assume also 
that settlement only takes place after economic recovery. For further details, see Miller and García-Fronti, 2005. 
25 But this bargaining prediction -- with first mover advantage to Argentina -- is consistent with the position taken by the Argentine 
government at Dubai when it decided to allocate 3% of GDP for debt service, a topic we return to later. 
26 Specifically, Miller and García-Fronti,(2005). show that the MW framework fits the Buenos Aires settlement (of $1.65bn for creditors) 
if a is equal to 55%. 
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FIGURE 1: Settlement after economic recovery: from Dubai to Buenos Aires.  
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The smaller pie in recession (a figure of $3.67b, being 2.64% of 2003 GDP expressed at 
2004 prices) is indicated by the dashed line in the figure -- where the increase in the size of 
the pie due to the recovery of the economy is 9% in real terms. (Point D indicates the flow 
of resources available for the creditors announced in Dubai measured on the same scale, 
clearly a good deal less favourable to the creditors than any of the bargaining outcomes 
discussed above: we indicate later how it may be interpreted as expressing a sustainability 
constraint rather than a bargaining offer.) By comparing the payoffs at points A and S, it 
seems clear that the creditor will tempted to delay, partly to gain a share of the growth 
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dividend and possibly to become first mover. But uncertainty about economic recovery and 
the cost of waiting need to be taken into account.  
 
Why the delay? 
 
There is no doubt that political factors played an important role in the timing of the events. 
If Argentina could have credibly committed to deliver more to creditors when the economy 
had recovered, then creditors might have agreed much earlier to what would in effect have 
been a state-contingent grace period.  That such state-contingent contracts were not 
acceptable may be attributed to political factors. Kohlscheen (2005) has argued, for 
example, that presidential systems are, in general, less to be trusted than their parliamentary 
counterparts;  and there was, in this case, an added problem of legitimacy as the country 
was being governed by an interim administration after default. When President Duhalde 
took office in early 2002 to complete the remainder of the term for which President De La 
Rua had initially been elected, he “took the decision to be only a transition between the 
government of De La Rua and the next government and for this reason did not pursue 
outstanding structural reforms, among which debt resolution was one of the most 
important” (Bruno, 2004, p.162).  
 
Was the political vacuum before June 2003 a necessary condition for the absence of an 
early offer? Though highly stylised, the Merlo-Wilson framework, where the size of the pie 
is variable, allows us to address this question. The condition for delay involves comparing 
the size of the pie in recession and with its future expected value (Merlo-Wilson, 1988, 
p.49). In particular, delay is efficient when the expected annual rate of recovery exceeds 
and the time rate of discount  27. The logic for this is that any settlement “locks in” the 
recession; when the condition is satisfied it pays to wait.   
 
Table 4, column 1 shows that the recorded rate of recovery during Duhalde’s administration 
ran at about 18% at annual rate. On the conservative assumption that this was only given a 
probability of 50% ex-ante, the “expected” growth rate of about 9% shown in the second 
                                                 
27 See Miller and García-Fronti (2005) for technical details. 
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column greatly exceeds the common discount rate of 4% in column 3. This means that debt 
restructuring would have been postponed even if there had been no problem of 
legitimacy28.  
 
Table 4: Why delay? 29 
Actual average 
Growth rate     (p.a.)
"Expected" average 
Growth rate (p.a.)
Discount 
rate
Delay under President Duhalde (2002 Q1 -2003 Q2) 17.60% 8.80% 4.00%
Delay under President Kirschner (2003 Q3 - 2004 Q4) 9.44% 4.72% 4.00%  
 
 
With the election of President Kirchner in mid-2003, the legitimacy issue was resolved: but 
delay continued for another year and a half. Can this be explained in the same fashion? Was 
the recession was still deep enough at the time of the Dubai proposal to lead to further 
postponement? The numbers in table 4 suggest it was: the “expected” rate of recovery 
under president Kirchner before 2005 (half the actual) was 4.7% on average, still more than 
the annual discount rate of 4%: so delay was still economically efficient 30.  
  
The bargaining framework used here, with variable payoffs but no contingent contracts, is 
capable of explaining the 3-year delay31. Political factors contributed essentially because 
they ruled out the ability to structure creditor’s repayment in a way that would allow for 
recovery. But political legitimacy itself does not appear to be the critical factor: even 
President Kirchner continued postponing a settlement.  
 
Note that the Argentine government did try to find a way around this problem by offering 
state-contingent bonds in the debt-restructuring. As recommended by Borensztein and 
Mauro (2002, 2004), for example, GDP-linked bonds were included in the menu of assets 
available to creditors. Despite the logic of the situation -- and the arguments advanced by 
                                                 
28 On the Merlo -Wilson assume that any agreement struck before recovery takes place “locks in” the recession: This is an issue we 
discuss in section 2. 
29 See Miller and García-Fronti (2005) for technical details of the calculations. Parameters used in this case (Merlo and Wilson, 1998, p. 
49-50) are: probability of being proposer ja =0.5, the transition probabilities are 0.5ijq = and the discount factor is 0.962b = . 
30 As observers such Daniel Heymman argued at the time 
31 Several observers have argued that the success of the Buenos Aires offer was due to good luck – contingent developments in the world 
economy. In a stylised way, the framework used here does predict that settlement depends on such random events: if bad luck had 
postponed the Argentine recovery, there would have been   no settlement. 
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Shiller (1993) as to why such instruments should play a useful role in completing existing 
asset markets -- creditors showed little enthusiasm for this new form of debt32. In the 
Buenos Aires offer, they only accounted for about 10% of the value of the swap.  
 
Checking the sustainability constraints 
 
Economic incentives for delay are captured in broad terms by the bargaining framework: 
but what of the specific commitments made at Dubai? What constraints did they impose on 
the bargaining process? We interpret the commitments as defining a strategy for reducing 
debt vulnerability – firstly by writing-down debt and then by running fiscal surpluses as we 
show in figure 2 below.  
 
The commitment to maintain a primary surplus, s, at 3% of GDP ensures that debt will be 
falling relative to GDP, at least below the critical value of  the debt/income ratio, d,  shown 
as d* in the figure. This is evident from the dynamics of d which to a linear approximation 
evolve as:  
( ) 0.014 0.03d r g d s d= - - = -&    (1) 
where 0.03 and 0.04 (1- ) 0.055s r x x= = + ; where x debt excluded from restructuring as a 
percentage of all debt after restructuring is 0.72; and g=0.03. (Note that in this is this linear 
approximation we are using post swap values of restructured debt, i.e. this approximation is 
only valid in the neighborhood of point B) 
 
The dynamics of debt are explosive, with d rising at increasing speed to the right of d* and 
contracting ever more quickly to the left. At d* itself, he surplus covers the real interest cost 
of debt corrected for the growth rate of the economy i.e. ( )s r g d= -  , so 0d =& . (This 
appears to be the stability condition used in p.19 of Calvo (2005), namely that the 
debt/income ratio should not be rising.)   
 
                                                 
32 In a related contribution, Arida et al. (2005) discuss the role of “jurisdictional” uncertainty in limiting the availability of long term debt 
contracts available in Brazil. 
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To ensure that the contraction of debt would proceed at a rate of at least 3% p.a. after 
restructuring, the Argentine government imposed a further condition namely that the 
surplus should cover the real interest cost of debt at the time of restructuring, i.e. s rd= . 
(Later, as the debt/income ratio falls with economic growth, a 3% primary surplus should  
more than cover interest costs, allowing for dollar debt reduction.)  
 
Substituting this requirement  into equation (1) gives the Dubai ‘initial condition’ of 
equation (2): 
d gd= -& or .03d g
d
= - = -
&
      (2). 
 
Figure 2: Dubai conditions for debt sustainability 
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Together these conditions define the strategy for reducing indebtedness. First discretely to 
reduce the debt level (and increase its rate of contraction) by a write-down, as shown by the 
move from A to B in the figure: then to reduce the debt/income ration gradually, but at an 
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increasing rate, as shown by the arrow to left of B. The combination of write-down and 
fiscal prudence is required to reduce sovereign indebtedness to manageable proportions. An 
initial debt write-down which succeeded in halving the debt burden, for example, (by 
cutting the debt income ratio from 150% to 75% GDP) would still leave the economy 
extremely vulnerable, bearing in mind Stanley Fischer’s (2001, Chap 2) comment “even if 
it is not possible to define an optimal debt-to-GDP ratio, it can safely be concluded that a 
60% ratio [ as in the  Maastricht Treaty] for an emerging market is too high, and that ratios 
nearer 30 percent are much safer.” (Reinhart et al. (2003) suggest an even lower debt/GDP 
ratio, 15%-20%, as appropriate for emerging market countries facing high sovereign 
spreads.)  
 
To see how sustainability considerations relate to the bargaining process analysed in the 
previous section, in Figure 3 we plot equation (2), the Dubai initial condition limiting debt 
service to 3% of GDP, together with the bargaining equilibrium itself, both plotted as 
increasing with GDP at 2004 prices. The bargaining equilibrium (with first mover 
advantage to the debtor) is indicated by the ray whose slope indicates that the creditor 
expects to get 1.2% of GDP, see Table 3, row 3. The dashed line depicts the 3% of GDP 
limit on debt service; and the parallel solid line shows the residual available for paying the 
creditors who own defaulted bonds – settling after servicing preferred debt in full (at a cost 
of $2.8bn a year).  
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FIGURE 3: Bargaining subject to a sustainability constraint 
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The implications are clear enough. Debt restructuring in 2003 with the economy in 
depression would have violated the sustainability condition: i.e. the Dubai residual lies well 
below the bargaining equilibrium at that date. But as the economy recovers the 
sustainability condition increases so that by 2004 it comes out as $1.79bn or 45% of the pie 
roughly matching the bargaining equilibrium we calculated as $1.85bn in Table 3 row 3. 
Even if, strictly speaking, sustainability considerations were to limit the creditors claim to 
45% of the pie, note that the actual offer made by Argentine government in 2005, valued at 
$1.65 or 41% of the pie (assuming the recovery rate on offer is extended to those outside 
the swap), does satisfy this condition.   
 
Although no formal account is taken of the 3% sustainability condition (and the high 
income elasticity of the constraint), it appears that the logic of our analysis is consistent 
with the need for a durable settlement: creditors who were willing to wait until the debtor 
could pay more effectively allowed Argentina to propose a sustainable settlement.  
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2. Wider considerations 
  
In part one, two-player non-cooperative bargaining theory is used to help explain the nature 
and timing of the Argentine debt swap. But the approach used takes no explicit account of 
the multiplicity of creditors, nor of the role of third parties in promoting ‘good faith’ 
bargaining. These issues merit further discussion, particularly if this case is to be used as a 
benchmark for future restructurings. 
 
2 (a) Creditor heterogeneity  
 
Holders of the defaulted sovereign were divided into intrinsically different categories: as 
well as retail investors from all over the world, there were investment banks and so-called 
vulture funds. Moreover, as Sgard (2005) points out, there was a “cleavage between the 
small German, Japanese and especially Italian bondholders (400,000), who bought stocks at 
par, and specialised investment funds which generally acquired them after default, at a 
heavily discounted price. The conditions offered by the Argentine government thus imply 
significant gains for the latter33 … which may reflect a tacit alliance with the US 
investment funds.” So, despite the heterogeneity of the creditors, and the refusal by the 
debtor to recognise any of the various creditor committees as negotiating partners, it 
appears that the activity of investment funds played a coordinating role by buying up 
distressed bonds and then negotiating with the sovereign. While the New York investment 
funds may have provided a negotiating counterparty to the sovereign debtor, these 
coordination services have evidently been supplied at a considerable cost to the average 
creditor. There is an apparent need for a more impartial and less costly representative of 
creditors as a whole. 
 
                                                 
33 They “… were buying euro-denominated defaulted bonds at below 30 cents on the dollar” - assets to be worth 37 cents after the swap. 
(Adam Thomson, 28 February 2005, Financial times p.23)  
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Is there a case for a Bondholder Committee?  
 
One possibility is the appointment of a trustee to ensure inter-creditor equity. But if, as is 
common with US bonds, the trustee requires unanimity for any change to the financial 
terms of the bond this leads to a ‘hold up’ problem where “vultures funds” buy distressed 
debt and litigate to recover the full value, refusing all offers to restructure the defaulted debt 
until they are given full compensation; such funds are extremely patient and persistent, 
being willing to wait for up to a decade in pursuit of full settlement for the bonds they have 
purchased. An alternative mechanism would be a formal bondholder committee as 
proposed by Eichengreen and Portes (1995) on the historical model of the 1930s : as Mauro 
and Yafeh (2003, p.26) note, “In the past … one of the roles of the Corporation of Foreign 
Bondholders (CFB) [was] to protect small bondholders from large bondholders who might 
otherwise arrange for a separate, advantageous deal for themselves in exchange for the 
promise to provide the country with new lending.”  
In fact, the incorporation of collective action clauses may help to solve the problem of hold-
outs. While Kletzer (2004) is relatively optimistic that strengthening CACs will eliminate 
inefficiency of holdout creditors in the future, however, others such as Fernandez and 
Fernandez (2004) and Ghosal and Thampanishvong (2005) point out that promoting 
creditor coordination in this way risks undermining the debtor’s incentive to bargain in 
good faith -- suggesting that there is a role for international financial institutions to 
complement CACs. 
 
 
2 (b) Third party intervention and “good faith” bargaining  
 
Role of the US court, G7 and the IMF 
 
There is no doubt that the court in New York sought to encourage the debtor to bargain in 
good faith. During 2003, for example, when Argentina proved reluctant to negotiate with 
creditors, Judge Griesa insisted on ‘good faith bargaining’ as a condition for restraining the 
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vulture funds:  and this may have been instrumental in triggering the Dubai offer.  But the 
cases appearing in court are principally brought by vulture funds who are not representative 
of the majority of creditors. In practice, it appears that the court has treated the vulture 
funds as a useful goad to bargaining but not to defining the settlement – the latter has 
emerged from the activity of investment banks, with the vultures still holding out.  
 
In the context of these negotiations, national law courts have had to decide important issues 
of principle affecting the fate of nations; so recourse to legal procedures may have 
reinforced the economic factors for delay discussed above. Creditors have typically been 
more optimistic about the efficacy of legal sanctions at their disposal than the debtor: when 
creditors appealed to the doctrine of pari passu to justify seizing money paid to senior 
creditors, for example, Argentina’s legal advisers staunchly opposed that view (Buchheit 
and Pam, 2003) . But the issue remained a matter of legal dispute until January 2005 when 
the law in Belgium which permitted Elliot Brothers to proceed against Peru on these 
grounds was repealed. Such delays may reflect the evolution of legal doctrine. 
 
What about the role of International Financial Institutions (IFIs)?34 The bargaining 
framework we use assumes both parties to the negotiations suffer from delay – as they 
cannot consume the pie until agreement is reached - and this provides the incentive to 
agree. But Argentina was paying no interest on the debt liable to restructuring and suffered 
little direct disruption of trade flows as a consequence. This ‘inside option’ - to carry on 
trading and consuming while negotiating with creditors who are getting no debt service - 
confers a bargaining advantage to the  debtor35.  The part played by the courts in promoting 
good faith bargaining and by the IMF/ G7 in protecting creditor rights have, we believe, 
acted substantially to offset this advantage for debtor. 
 
Outside the law courts, there are two ways this has been achieved. First through direct 
economic pressure by G7 banks restricting trade credit available to finance Argentine 
                                                 
34 See Buchheit (2005) for a historical survey. There is a body of research that examines their role in the context of debt renegotiations 
from a game theoretical perspective, for example Bhattacharya and Detragiache (1994) and Bulow and Rogoff  (1988). But in these 
papers the IFIs were treated as an ex-post mechanism for transferring resources to the debtor, rather than as agents for the international 
community to ensure good faith bargaining and sustainability in the post default situation. 
35 See Muthoo (1998) for further discussion of inside options. 
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exports: while state restrictions on Argentine trade may violate WTO obligations, 
restrictions of trade credit are a legitimate tactic open to creditors to increase their 
bargaining power, (Kohlscheen and O’Connell 2004). Second, IMF executive directors 
from creditor countries can use their influence in the IMF to seek either tougher 
conditionality – an increased fiscal surplus, for example -  or an end to rollovers of official 
lending. (No rollover of outstanding official loans would imply an immediate cash call of 
around $6bn in the second half of the 2005, for example). Could this not lead to a trial of 
strength where the debtor counters by threatening to default on its debt to that organisation? 
Then, according to the Financial Times36, “The IMF must shrug off such blackmail. If 
Argentina did default on its multilateral debt it would lose access to World Bank and Inter-
American Development Bank credits and many sources of private finance - and risk a 
broader clash with the entire membership of the IMF.”  
 
Is there a case for an arbitration forum? 
 
Historical experience of the 20th century shows that resolution of sovereign default can be 
assisted by a third party arbitrator placed between debtor and the creditors who can attest 
the fairness of “burden-sharing” as well as “good faith” bargaining. This was the role of the 
American Money Doctors at the beginning of the century, then the League of Nations and 
finally the IMF, Sgard(2005). As a major creditor with senior status, the IMF can hardly 
play the role of disinterested arbitrator: nor has it done so. But if the IMF is sidelined, who 
will play that role?  
 
A case can be made for an explicit international forum for arbitration, ideally recognised by 
all nations under whose jurisdiction debt is issued. In his proposals for a sovereign debt 
restructuring procedure, Steven Schwarcz outlines how such a tribunal may be constituted.  
                                                 
36 Editorial comment: “Argentina’s duty” Financial Times April 29 2005. 
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He observes first that:  
“The International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), an 
autonomous body created under the auspices of the World Bank, provides facilities 
for the arbitration of investment disputes between contracting States and nationals in 
other States.  A small Secretariat … maintains a panel of multinational arbitrators 
with recognized competence in the fields of law, commerce, industry and finance.” 
And goes on to conclude: 
“Thus, ICSID is a useful model to the extent that a tribunal is needed to resolve 
sovereign debt restructuring disputes. A tribunal based on that model could maintain 
a panel of neutral arbitrators having recognized competence in bankruptcy and 
insolvency law. Rules could require panel members to have different nationalities, 
and to be representative of the principal bankruptcy and insolvency law systems of 
the world. Similarly, the tribunal’s expenses could be met by charging a fee for the 
arbitration. Finally, the arbitration could follow ICSID’s simple format: it would 
involve a panel of up to three arbitrators who decide disputes by majority vote in 
accordance with applicable rules of international law, and who render decisions that 
are binding and not subject to appeal.” (Schwarcz 2000, pp1024-6). 
Although there was no appeal to an arbitrator in the Argentine case, the Buenos Aires offer 
accepted by a supermajority (76%) of creditors was tantamount to a “pesification” of 
Argentine dollar debt (including past due interest). Is this not what an arbitrator would have 
proposed?37  
 
3. Conclusion   
 
In a positive analysis, we have described how a bargaining approach can be used to explain 
the Argentine sovereign debt swap of 2005, assuming that there are mechanisms to ensure 
‘good faith’ bargaining. The framework also helps to account for the considerable lapse of 
time in this case – just over three years from default to majority acceptance of the swap. 
                                                 
37 There is a theoretical literature on the role of arbitration on bargaining outcomes: Manzini and Mariotti (2001), for example, propose a 
modification of the Rubinstein model where the responder in any period has the option of appealing to arbitration. 
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Political factors ruled out state contingent contracts, so expectations of economic recovery 
led to delay by negotiators seeking a sustainable settlement. 
 
After considering the role of third parties in promoting a “good faith” bargaining, the US 
Court, for example, and the IMF (acting as agent for G7) a case is made for a formal 
process of arbitration. How creditor heterogeneity has affected the negotiations is also 
considered; and how coordination has been achieved so far. The coordination problem has 
not been finally resolved, however, as only 76% of old bonds have been swapped. Creditors 
outside the swap include vultures seeking full recovery whose attempt to block the swap 
(by seizing bonds surrendered by other creditors) was ruled as illegal, apparently on the  
grounds that it threatened the wishes of the supermajority. Could it be that the Manhattan 
court is managing a world in transition by acting as if the defaulted bonds included CACs? 
(Collective Action Clauses) The fall in the price of defaulted bonds after the swap (from 
around 40 cents to 32 cents for 2008 bonds, for example) suggests that holdouts may, on 
this occasion, suffer a bigger debt write down than those who settled – perhaps receiving 
the new performing bonds as in the 2005 offer less the coupons paid pending the final 
resolution38.  
                                                 
38 With CACs, holdouts would have received the offer accepted by the super-majority. 
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